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Achieving better stewardship of major infrastructure assets through 
configuration of governance arrangements utilising Stewardship Theory 
Abstract—Major infrastructure assets are often governed by a mix of public and private organizations, 
each fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or maintenance.  This mix of 
entities is a legacy of Public Choice Theory influenced NPM reforms of the late 20th century.  The 
privatization of the public sector has resulted in agency theory based ‘self-interest’ relationships and 
governance arrangements for major infrastructure assets which emphasize economic efficiency but 
which do not do not advance non-economic public values and the collective Public Interest.  The 
community is now requiring that governments fulfill their stewardship role of also satisfying 
non-economic public values such as sustainability and intergenerational responsibility. 
In the 21st century governance arrangements which minimize individual self-interest alone and look to 
also pursue the interests of other stakeholders have emerged. Relational contracts, Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP’s) and hybrid mixes of organizations from the state, market and network modes (Keast 
et al 2006) provide options for governance which better meet the interests of contractors, government 
and the community there is emerging a body of research which extends the consideration of the 
immediate governance configuration to the metagovernance environment constituted by hierarchy, 
regulation, industry standards, trust, culture and values.  Stewardship theory has reemerged as a valuable 
aid in the understanding of the features of governance configurations which establish relationships 
between principal and agent which maximize the agent acting in the interests of the principal, even to the 
detriment of the agent. 
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This body of literature suggests that an improved stewardship outcome from infrastructure governance 
configurations can be achieved by the application of the emerging options as to the immediate 
governance configuration, and the surrounding metagovernance environment.  Stewardship theory 
provides a framework for the design of the relationships within that total governance environment, 
focusing on the achievement of a better, complete stewardship outcome. 
This paper explores the directions future research might take in seeking to improve the understanding 
of the design of the governance of major, critical infrastructure assets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
STEWARDSHIP THEORY offers a lens through which to examine the demands upon governments to 
improve the performance of the asset, not only against economic measures but to meet developing public 
values of sustainability of use and intergenerational responsibility.  
 Major infrastructure assets are now governed by a mix of public and private organization types, each 
fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation and/or maintenance.  The mix of 
organizational types reflects the late 20th century heritage of economic rationalist reforms labeled New 
Public Management (NPM) and includes government departments, statutory corporations, government 
companies and private companies.  NPM reforms brought efficiency to infrastructure service provision 
but through their focus on the self-interest of the individual organization (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007) 
have resulted in governance arrangements, organizational forms and contractual arrangements which do 
not advance non-economic public values and the collective ‘Public Interest’.  Agency theory is key to 
that focus on the self-interest of the individual (Hood 1991, Waterman & Meier 1998) underpinning both 
the relationships between the organizations and the formal contractual arrangements, typically between a 
government entity and a private sector service provider. 
The public environment of the 21st century has reconsidered the benefits of private sector delivery of 
services expressing concern that NPM reforms have injected ‘managerialism’, private sector values, 
responsibilities and actions into the management of public sector delivery that are detrimental to public 
good (Grimshaw et al 2002).  Governance arrangements which eschew individual self-interest alone 
and look to also pursue the interests of other stakeholders have emerged.  Relational contracts have been 
introduced for infrastructure construction projects (Waterhouse et al 2002, Grimshaw et al 2002, Keast et 
al 2005) and hybrid mixes of organizations from the state, market and network modes (Keast et al 2006) 
have demonstrated the capacity to both meet economic objectives and to provide a decision-making 
process which includes non-economic public values (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007). 
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To respond to this shift in community orientation, different approaches to conceptualizing the 
operation of new organizational and structural arrangements for the provision of public goods and 
services are required.  Research has begun to consider the use of new governance arrangements in 
solving ‘wicked’ social issues (Keast et al 2006), but the scope of the literature is limited in that the 
specific area of governance arrangements for large infrastructure assets is not well covered.  Much of the 
literature concentrates on the asset at the stage of development with particular attention being given to 
efficiency and innovation by way of relational contracts (Waterhouse et al 2002, Keast et al 2005) and 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s) (Hodge & Greve 2007) which were configured to provide for all 
phases of the project, from Exploration to Operation as described in the continuum described by 
Koppenjan (2005) in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Koppenjan (2005)  
The phases of project development 
 
Yet the considerable majority of major infrastructure assets are no longer projects but rather are in the 
“operate and maintain” phase of their life-cycle.  The challenge of achieving stewardship outcomes 
during this maintenance phase is made more difficult by heightening risk and increasing accountability 
requirements, conditional government funding and reducing maintenance funding (Cagle 2003).  To 
increase the benefit gained by the proposed research into the governance of infrastructure assets 
particular focus will be given to governance configuration for major infrastructure assets in the operation 
and maintenance phase. 
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Stewardship theory is different from the agency model of both the principal and the agent pursuing 
rational self-interested utility maximization by purporting that in certain circumstances the agent acts in 
the interests of the principal, even to the detriment of the agent (Donaldson & Davis 1991, Davis et al 
1997 and Van Slyke 2007).  Stewardship theory highlights the limitations of the strict agency model and 
through the framework of psychological and situational factors identified by Davis et al (1997) provides 
a medium through which the features of current infrastructure asset governance arrangements can be 
considered and offers the possibility of achieving a better stewardship outcome. 
Public values offer a suitable framework for defining the stewardship role of governments and for 
consideration of the relative success of governance configurations in achieving the economic and 
non-economic stewardship outcome.  The framework of public values applying to selected major 
infrastructure assets in the Netherlands developed by Van Gestel et al (2008) offers a base for further 
research. 
 This paper will firstly discuss the modern public environment, the effect of NPM based ‘privatisation’ 
of the public sector, the role of public values, and the contribution of both the immediate principal-agent 
governance configuration and surrounding metagovernance environment.  Secondly, the general concept 
of stewardship and the tenets of stewardship theory are explored, particularly the potential of 
stewardship theory to go beyond the understandings offered by agency theory.  Thirdly opportunities for 
research which may lead to a more precise understanding of the emerging stewardship responsibilities of 
governments and the features of governance and metagovernance arrangements which optimise the 
complete stewardship outcome will be identified. 
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II. MODERN PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT 
 Governance arrangements in the modern public environment have been formed through decades of 
reform to the roles of public sector and private sector actors.  The NPM reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s 
were heavily influenced by Public Choice theory which criticized public sectors as being monopolistic, 
bureaucratic and inefficient (Hood 1991, Osborne & Gaebler 1992, Grimshaw et. al 2002).  The NPM 
solution was the opening up to competition of previous public monopolies through activities such as 
privatization, commercialization and contracting out as well as the wide application of neo-liberal 
economic models and the adoption of private sector management principles.  Such economic models and 
private sector management practices were not only applied to genuine market situations but also to 
non-market circumstances (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000) and market based remedies were applied to 
public infrastructure notwithstanding infrastructure typically being natural monopolies (Cannadi & 
Dollery 2005) and notwithstanding the satisfactory economic performance of infrastructure assets being 
only one of the prevailing public values. 
 The NPM reforms have meant that ‘managerialism’ has prevailed with many of the values of private 
sector management becoming values of the public sector (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000, Grimshaw et. al 
2002).  Yet governments or their entities are not simply required to maximize profits but rather are 
subject to political influence and are often required to meet other objectives, such as the ‘public interest’ 
(Hughes 1998).  For the UK government the public interest translates to the need to have regard to other, 
shared or collective values requiring collaborative rather than competitive organizational forms 
(Entwistle & Martin 2005).  More directly Beck-Jorgensen & Bozeman (2002) argue that privatization 
and contracting out often have the effect of eroding public values. 
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 These criticisms of NPM evoke the question as to whether current governance arrangements for 
infrastructure assets have the capacity to perform a stewardship role that considers the shared values of 
the community and the ‘public interest’.  Redford (1954) defines the ‘public interest’ as being the best 
response to a situation in terms of all the interests and the concepts of value which are generally accepted 
by a society.  Stone (1988) builds on that definition adding the dimension of active pursuit of shared, 
collective values.  This pursuit of collective values contrasts with the market-based (NPM) concept of the 
public interest being the sum of the self-interest of individuals.  That active pursuit of the public interest 
is seen by Denhardt & Denhardt (2007) as the responsibility of government.  Denhardt & Denhardt 
(2007) assert that governments need to ensure that the public interest predominates through meeting 
democratic norms and values by devising solutions to public problems, and devising the processes by 
which such solutions are implemented.  Satisfying both those non-economic ‘public interest’ values and 
economic values without unintended dominance of any one public value is a key challenge for 
infrastructure asset governance. 
 But what are these public values? 
 Simply put, public values at the highest conceptual level are those values held by democracies and 
societies e.g. democracy, efficiency, sustainability, which are the standards for people and organizations 
as to how to behave in society (Van Gestel et al 2007).  Yet the task of governments in meeting public 
values is not simple.  Public values are relative and may even be ambiguous and conflicting, requiring a 
trade-off through judgment which often tends to be subjective (De Bruijn & Dicke 2006).  Public values 
will be subject to tensions and conflicts between values (e.g. efficiency versus accessibility).  A public 
value will not be held constant over time by the community but rather, the relative importance of the 
public value may change over time (Van Gestel et al 2008).  This ambiguity, and conflict and flux in 
relative importance of values poses a considerable risk when actors seek to operationalize the public 
values (De Bruijn et. al. 2008).  Public values become frozen by hierarchical devices such as 
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specification, regulation and oversight (all elements of governance and metagovernance), which Van 
Gestel et al (2008) observe lead to the dominance of a particular rationality or value, to the exclusion of 
others.  
 How then are these public values met when governments pursue their stewardship  responsibilities?. 
 These public values, serve both the role of constituting the stewardship responsibilities and as a major 
expression of the culture of the wider environment within which the immediate governance 
configuration of principal and agent entities operates.  The relationship between organizations which 
constitute the governance configuration immediate to the infrastructure asset, is the subject of the major 
part of the literature yet this immediate environment is contained in the larger environment which 
provides safeguarding mechanisms which can be configured into governance mechanisms.  The 
configuration of a set of institutional arrangements, encompassing conventional contracts, relational 
contracts and the creation of a separate entity, in a way that would enable government to devolve its 
obligations and objectives as the political principal was conceptualized by Baker et al (2008) as 
metagovernance.  Whilst this view of “metagovernance” is in effect limited to the immediate 
principal/agent relationship an alternative conceptualization is offered by Koppenjan & Ryan (2007) as a 
structure of mechanisms to safeguard public values which is much broader and which acknowledges the 
contribution of various behaviors and relationships which underpin stewardship theory.  Koppenjan & 
Ryan (2007) saw safeguarding mechanisms as encompassing the choice of organizations, laws 
(including regulations and policies), the market, negotiations, interdependencies and trust between actors 
in “networks” plus the culture with its dimension of consensus around common values and norms. 
 The availability of this broad range of safeguarding mechanisms together with the underlying concept 
of managing the issues surrounding public values (ambiguity, conflict between values and flux in the 
relative importance of values) redirects research beyond the principal-agent, department-private 
contractor paradigm of immediate governance arrangements towards the wider metagovernance 
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environment as an area of research which will add to our knowledge of the variables which influence the 
achievement of stewardship.  
III. STEWARDSHIP 
 Within the overall metagovernance environment governments and their public sector entities together 
with private sector entities are said to be stewards for infrastructure assets.  What is this stewardship 
role?  Do they as agents in a principal/agent contractual role display the self-interested, opportunistic 
behaviors portrayed as typical by agency theory?  Do they behave differently from the agency model? Is 
there a theory which explains their behavior? 
In this section of the paper the general concept of stewardship is first examined together with 
consideration of examples of industries which are acknowledged for their focus upon stewardship 
responsibilities.  Then the reemerging Stewardship theory is explored both for its potential to understand 
the limitations of Agency theory-based traditional principal/agent relationships and to understand how to 
enhance the stewardship outcome by configuration of relationships.   
 Stewardship has a long history dating back many centuries.  Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis (2000) 
acknowledge the Biblical reference of the parable of the talents where stewardship is portrayed as 
entrusting the steward with something of value and the steward being obligated to improve the asset.  In 
a public sector context the concept of stewardship of assets for the public good was a mainstay of its 
operation but this underpinning principle was supplanted in the NPM reforms of the 1980s with the drive 
to implement private sector management values as a public sector value.  More recently stewardship as a 
guiding principle or public value has re-emerged as a response to calls to take into account the long-term 
effects of a broader range of issues such as managerialism, environmental sustainability and 
intergenerational responsibilities.  An understanding of the variation in the concepts of stewardship can 
be gained from the work of Birnberg (1980) who sought to define the objectives of the modern financial 
accounting relationships between the custodian and the owner.  Birnberg (1980) used the levels of 
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control in managerial systems (operational, managerial and strategic) to describe the range of forms of 
stewardship.  Birnberg (1980) identified a traditional custodial form, an asset utilization orientation form 
and an open ended form.  The traditional custodial form requires the steward to take care of the item and 
return it to the owner with the corpus intact and reflects the characteristics of operational control.  The 
asset utilization form has the steward’s role set in terms of goals and targets rather than with reference to 
the specific assets and the manner of utilization.  The differentiation between the custodial stewardship 
and asset utilization stewardship is in the judgment allowed to, and required of the servant.  The asset 
utilizing steward is expected to provide initiative and insight and the owner of the asset has only a 
general idea of the course of action contemplated when the relationship was initiated with the 
steward-owner relationship being similar to managerial control.  The “open ended” form is so named as 
the owner has assets such as money or real estate for which the steward is entrusted to chart the course of 
asset utilization and determine the critical point of time when the assets are converted.  The steward has 
an “open ended” charge to meet objectives which are most often set as financial, monetary returns on the 
value of the asset with the stewardship relationship being similar to strategic control eg. shareholders of 
modern corporations requiring executives as stewards to generate a specified level of profit.  The nature 
of these stewardship relationships and a comparison with levels of managerial control are set out in 
Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2 Birnberg (1908) 
Forms of stewardship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This distinction between these forms of stewardship brings under focus assertions that stewardship is 
needed or that stewardship responsibilities are being met evoking the questions: 
 What form of  stewardship of a particular asset is required of the government by the  community?   
 What is the extent of the stewardship currently being provided?   
The work of Birnberg (1980) contributes a key element of a framework which can be created to better 
examine the link between the requirements of  the community, its public values, and the governance 
arrangements and to understand the extent to which stewardship responsibilities are being met. 
 Stewardship responsibilities have been formally established across industries eg. the North American 
forest wood industry, and across whole areas of concern to the community eg. stewardship of the 
physical environment.  The North American forest wood sector has a focus on sustainability utilizing the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) as a key element of governance contributing a market-based 
certification and labeling scheme which adds value to the wood product from a marketing perspective.  
The FSC provides a governance mechanism at the metagovernance level and as a multi-stakeholder 
NGO with members from civil society, environmental groups and the industry supply chain offers an 
alternative to traditional government solutions such as legislation, regulation or standards.  Caution in 
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adopting this form might be exercised as the FSC belongs to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
model of governance systems which Verdonk et al (2007) note requires active, conscious consumers.  
Yet infrastructure assets such as roads and energy supply do not have active, conscious consumers but 
often are monopoly services, there being no active market forces in play to allow for consumer choice.  In 
the context of the physical environment environmental stewardship has progressively developed into a 
form of governance (Gray & Hatchard 2007) comprised of all forces driving the environment related 
agenda forward, including government regulations, economic incentives and social pressures and 
reflects values shared throughout the community. 
 The emergence of these governance arrangements which do not rely solely on the configuration of 
organizational entities evokes the questions: 
 Are similar shared values emerging around infrastructure assets? 
 Can shared public values around infrastructure be utilized as a component of a  governance 
 configuration which promotes stewardship? 
 Stewardship theory offers a means to help explain the emergent view that relationships between 
individuals and between organizations are something more than those of self-interested actors.  It extends 
agency theory beyond its economic interpretation to include non-economic influences including the 
psychological (such as e.g. identification and power) and the situational (management philosophy and 
power) (Davis, et al. 1997).  The key assumption of Stewardship theory is that directors (Donaldson & 
Davis 1991), managers and staff (Davis, et al. 1997 and Van Slyke 2007) are trustworthy and are 
inherently motivated to act in the interests of the principal, even if this is to the detriment of the agent.  
The steward seeks to attain the objectives of the organization to such and extent that there is potential for 
the goals of the agent and principal to be perfectly aligned (Davis, et al. 1997). 
 Agency theory is often utilized in a highly normative way to describe the conflicts of interest that can 
arise between principals and agents not allowing for the inter-organizational and interpersonal 
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relationships which invariably are more complex (Davis, et al. 1997, Van Slyke 2007).  In contrast 
Stewardship theory has the capacity to identify aspects of long term contractual relations such as trust, 
reputation, collective goals, and relational reciprocity (Van Slyke 2007) and the monitor and control 
relationship inherent in the agency model.  The main themes, tenets of Agency theory and Stewardship 
theory as summarized  by Van Slyke (2007) are set out in Table 1. 
Table 1 Van Slyke (2007) 
Agency theory and stewardship theory 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Themes Goal incongruence:  
• Assumes goal divergence based on 
self-interested rational actors.   
• Initial disposition is to distrust. 
• Control-oriented management 
philosophy.  
• Theoretical assumptions are derived 
from economics. 
Goal alignment:  
• Mutual goals and objectives achieved 
through initial trust disposition.  
• Involvement-oriented management 
philosophy.   
• Theoretical assumptions derived 
from organizational behavior, 
psychology, and sociology. 
Theoretical tenets Use of incentives and sanctions to 
foster goal alignment: 
• Assign risk to the agent to ensure 
goal compliance 
• Monitoring 
• Reward systems 
• Use of bonding threat to reputation 
Empowers workers through: 
• Responsibility 
• Autonomy 
• Share culture and norms 
• Personal power and trust 
• Other governance mechanisms 
Applications 9 Eliminate opportunistic behavior 
9 Provide the level of incentives and 
sanctions which reduce the threat 
of information asymmetry 
9 Correct, through specific contract 
requirements, for asset specificity 
and moral hazard 
9 Uses reputation as an incentive 
and sanction 
9 Ensure goal alignment  
9 Goal alignment based on shared 
goals and trust 
9 Reward workers through 
non-pecuniary mechanisms 
9 Reduces the threat of opportunistic 
behavior through responsibility and 
autonomy 
9 Reduces the threat to the 
organization of information 
asymmetries, moral hazard, and 
asset specificity 
9 Reduces dependence on legal 
contracts to enforce behavior 
9 Uses reputation as an incentive and 
sanction 
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 In summary stewardship theory asserts that if the governance mechanisms are configured to maximize 
the features identified with stewardship theory such as trust and autonomy then there is greater likelihood 
of the steward achieving the bests interests of the principal.  This positive correlation between the 
application of stewardship theory when configuring the governance and metagovernance mechanisms 
and the achievement of an optimum governance outcome (the interests of the principal, for infrastructure 
the government as surrogate for the community) is described in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3  
Relationship between design configuration and governance outcome 
Design Configuration 
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agency theory but the initial disposition of nonprofit executive directors was consistent with stewardship 
theory.  Yet in suburban counties nonprofits identified the existence of a legitimate risk of contract 
termination and public managers cited limited administrative capacity and their perception that they 
lacked the capacity to internalize services presently being put to contract.  This resulted in both principals 
and agents adopting behaviors consistent with agency theory (Van Slyke 2007).  In contrast urban and 
non-urban counties (Van Slyke 2007) found relationships which strongly utilized trust and reputation in 
a manner clearly consistent with the tenets of stewardship theory.  An Agency theory approach might be 
chosen if the principal (especially risk adverse bureaucrats) do not have the appetite for the risk inherent 
in moving from the agency-model, controlling environment to the trusting, empowering stewardship 
environment (Davis, et al. 1997).  Alternatively the agent may not trust the principal (Davis, et al. 1997). 
 Van Slyke (2007) offers further understanding as to why agency theory or stewardship theory is chosen 
observing that the contextual characteristics (the type of service, the lack of market competitiveness, and 
management capacity constraints) had a significant impact on how contract relationships were managed 
in the context of the various New York nonprofit service providers but are not well accounted for in 
either theory.  For these theories to assist in developing better infrastructure governance configurations 
methods for taking into consideration the contextual characteristics applying to the particular 
infrastructure asset must be developed. 
 Stewardship theory may therefore provide a means to help explain the emergent view that the 
relationships between individuals and organizations are something more than reflections of the agency 
model self-interest of actors and help extend agency theory beyond its economic interpretation to include 
non-economic influences including the psychological (such as identification and power) and the 
situational (management philosophy and power) (Davis, et al. 1997). 
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IV. INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE  
 The stewardship of infrastructure assets is currently performed through governance arrangements 
involving a mix of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, 
ownership, operation or maintenance.  This section seeks firstly to understand the features of the key 
organizational elements i.e. the various entities used to form the immediate governance configuration.  
Secondly the options as to contractual relationships and Private Public Partnerships (PPP’s) which are a 
specific combination of the public and private entities and contracts configured to meet needs for the 
provision of infrastructure.  Thirdly the role of public values in determining expectations as to the 
outcome of governance of infrastructure assets will be examined. 
 The traditional department in Australia originates from the mid 19th century British experience.  
However, the newly formed Australian states found departments to be inappropriate for railway systems, 
development programs and commercial activities (Wettenhall 2003).  For these purposes statutory 
authorities were utilized and strengthened with the status of corporate body (Wettenhall 2005).  In the 
1980s and 1990s the use of statutory corporations for infrastructure was often replaced by government 
owned companies utilizing corporations law passed primarily for use in the private sector (Hood 1991, 
Thynne 1994, Wettenhall 2003).  The intention was to facilitate participation in level playing field 
arrangements for the conduct of government activities and contracting within the public sector (Hood 
1997). 
 Contractual or market relationships have been utilized between the public and private sectors to 
provide infrastructure services with the public sector normally retaining ownership of specific-purpose 
assets and operational responsibility for the provision of core services (Quiggan 2005).  The traditional 
private sector style contracts allowed government to ‘steer’ by precisely specifying the outputs required 
and terms of payment, allocation of risk and penalties (Hood 1997).  Contracts have been considered key 
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to the achievement of efficiency and accountability (Hood 1997) but that accountability is often limited 
to quantified economic measures. 
Traditional contracts are underpinned by agency theory (Muth & Donaldson 1998) which is premised 
on both the principal and the agent being motivated by self-interest utility maximization (Hood 1991, 
Waterman & Meier 1998).  Agents seek to maximize their utility at the expense of the utility of the 
principal, creating a conflict of goals between the principal and the agent resulting in an agency cost to 
the principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Agency cost for infrastructure projects typically comes from the selection of the contractor and the 
monitoring of the contract and legal disputation (even between private consortium partners) (Hodge 
2004) which all reduce the economic efficiency of the contracting out model and undermine the policy 
goal (Baker et al 2008).  A recurrent, major contributor to that agency cost of tightly specified, traditional 
adversarial contracts is the prevalence of disputes and litigation over the performance of the contracted 
work and associated allegations of opportunism on the part of the private sector service providers (Keast 
et al 2005).  These persistent significant problems with the traditional contract led to questions about the 
extent to which the needs of the public were being met and resulted in some cases in the introduction of 
‘relational contracts’ (Grimshaw et al 2002), particularly in infrastructure construction projects 
(Waterhouse et al 2002, Grimshaw et al 2002, Keast et al 2005).  These relational contracts placed an 
emphasis on permeable organizing practices intended to yield mutually beneficial outcomes in major 
infrastructure projects (Waterhouse et al 2002).  Inherent in this view is that market structure and the 
organizing principles of the quasi-market are less important than the form of contractual relationship and 
the nature of organizational form (Grimshaw et al 2002). 
The PPP is an alternative to contracting out and privatization of infrastructure is the PPP.  These are 
used world-wide and are long-term contracts between government and private business for a 
combination of services, construction or financing in return for some combination of public funds, public 
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assets or user fees (Brown 2007).  The private element of a PPP may be an alliance or joint owned 
company which is entirely private sector owned, bringing complexity to PPPs and additional risk to the 
public partner (Hodge 2004).  The more common form of the PPP is that introduced through the UK 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Brown 2007) the aims of which were to move public sector debt to the 
private sector and later to achieve value for money objectives such as on-time, on-budget completion or 
accessing scarce design expertise and construction skills (Hodge & Greve (2007).  A learning from 
PPP’s is the focus on mutual achievement of business objectives based on cooperation around respective 
competitive strengths, replacing the antagonistic public versus private dualism with harmonious, 
synergistic duality of partnership (Grimshaw et. al (2002). 
The expectation as to the outcome of the governance of infrastructure assets is heavily influenced by 
public values.  Assistance in understanding the role of public values in determining expectations as to the 
stewardship of infrastructure assets is offered by the experience of the Netherlands with the interplay of 
public values in the operation of public infrastructure by both public and private organizations (De 
Bruijn & Dicke 2006, De Bruijn et. al. 2008, Van Gestel et al 2007, Van Gestel et al 2008) and public 
organizations (Van Thiel 2008). 
 Van Gestel et al (2008) had regard to theoretical perspectives as to public values and to the opinions of 
a broad range of stakeholders and the stakeholder’s own definition of the appropriate public values at 
play throughout the stages of six infrastructure projects and developed the taxonomy set out below in 
Public Values – Netherlands public infrastructure projects, Table 2. 
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Table 2 Van Gestel et al (2008) 
Public Values – Netherlands public infrastructure projects 
 
Public values with respect to: Examples 
Government – Public values which govern the relationship 
between government and society in general. 
Democracy, legitimacy 
Reliability 
Efficient use of public resources 
Employers – Public values involved in the relationship between 
employers, employees and clients in the sector or project. 
Quality of services 
Safety of employees, customers 
Reliability of employers 
Infrastructure(target groups) – The suitability of infrastructure 
and services to specific target groups such as low-income 
groups, or the handicapped. 
Universal access 
Low prices 
Specific tools for handicapped people 
Infrastructure(regional economy) – The contribution of 
infrastructure to regional economic development. 
Economic development 
Mobility 
Environmental quality 
Infrastructure(general social effects) – Public values in the 
relationship between the infrastructure and the direct social 
environment. 
Safety 
Health 
Sustainability 
 
Van Gestel et al (2008) then used this multi level framework of values to analyze the data from each case 
study, firstly for tensions and conflicts between various public values throughout each project; secondly 
to identify the trade-offs between conflicting public values; and thirdly, to understand the role of culture, 
contracts and hierarchy in the management of public/private networks.  Key findings were; firstly that 
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the public values considered most important at the start of all projects e.g. economic development and 
environmental quality were not the values that received the most attention in the later stages of those 
same projects (efficiency, transparency and democracy); and secondly that the management of public 
values was based mainly on shared culture, whilst contracts and hierarchy were less important 
instruments for management of public values (Van Gestel et al 2008). 
 How then are governance and metagovernance arrangements configured to provide the flexibility to 
 accommodate the ambiguity inherent in public values?   
 How can stewardship theory inform the configuration of infrastructure governance? 
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 21st century governance arrangements which minimize individual self-interest and promote the 
interests of the principal (the government or the community) have emerged and have demonstrated both 
the capacity to meet economic objectives and provide a decision-making process which includes 
non-economic public values.  Stewardship theory has emerged as a device to identify relationships 
between organizations and individuals which eschew the agency model and focus on the shared 
objective.  Community expectations that such non-economic values also be satisfied require that 
governments carry out a complete stewardship role.  The emerging questions are: 
1. How can the knowledge of these emerging forms of governance and Stewardship theory be 
brought together to conceptualize the operation of new organizational and structural 
arrangements for the provision of public goods and services? 
2. What are the principles to be applied in the design of infrastructure governance arrangements 
which promote achievement of the complete stewardship outcome? 
 
 The proposed research will build on the framework of public values applying to infrastructure assets 
established by Van Gestel et al 2008.  The values held by a particular community can then be confirmed 
and their current relative importance established.  This understanding of the particular prevailing public 
values and their relative importance will allow the identification of the dimensions of the stewardship 
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role of the government.  With that Government stewardship role established consideration can then be 
given to the application of stewardship theory to the design of the metagovernance environment and in 
turn the immediate governance configuration applying to the particular infrastructure asset.  That design 
is directed to the objective of optimizing the stewardship outcome.  The links between these key 
elements, together with the ideal sequence of their determination is set out in Figure 4 “Aligning the key 
elements of the Infrastructure Stewardship Environment”. 
Figure 4  
Aligning key elements of the infrastructure stewardship environment 
 
Governments  
Stewardship 
Role 
 Public 
Values 
Metagovernance 
Environment 
Governance 
Configuration 
Optimum 
Governance 
Outcome 
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That alignment can be advanced by developing the body of knowledge through further research focusing 
on two areas, the public values which define the infrastructure stewardship role of the government, and 
the contribution of stewardship theory to infrastructure metagovernance and governance configuration. 
 Public values surrounding major infrastructure assets might be examined to test the relevance of the 
framework of public values established by Van Gestel et al 2008 in another environment and to establish 
the suite of public values, and their current relative importance, applying to particular infrastructure 
assets or classes of assets e.g. an electricity generator or electricity generators across Australia.  This 
understanding of the particular prevailing public values and their relative importance will allow the 
definition of the stewardship role of the government. 
 Stewardship theory can be developed beyond the work of Van Slyke (2007) to understand why agency 
theory or stewardship theory models are chosen having particular regard to the contextual characteristics 
(the type of service, the extent of market competitiveness, and management capacity constraints).  The 
current immediate governance configurations and surrounding metagovernance arrangements of major 
infrastructure assets for two distinct groupings of case studies might be examined, those of NPM 
configurations i.e. departments contracting out, traditional contracts, and emerging configurations i.e. 
relational contracts, networks and PPP’s.  This will allow identification of any correlation between 
stewardship theory based inter-organizational relationships and categories of configurations and in turn 
stewardship outcomes as measured by satisfaction of public values.  Criteria to be examined may be 
drawn from Stewardship theory, addressing dimensions such as trust, focus on outputs or outcomes and 
the perceptions of actors as to responsibility for the interests of others utilizing the models of stewardship 
developed by Birnberg (1980). 
 This proposed research, with its focus upon the public values which define the infrastructure 
stewardship role of the government, and the contribution of stewardship theory to infrastructure 
governance will provide academics and management practioners with knowledge which will assist in the 
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better configuration of governance arrangements and in turn an improved stewardship outcome for each 
major infrastructure asset. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has re-positioned stewardship theory to provide an emergent model for understanding the 
requirements for the design of effective governance arrangements for major, critical infrastructure assets. 
The emerging new public environment provides a counterpoint to the economic model, achieving an 
acknowledgement of a need for organizations or individuals to act in the ‘public interest’.  The concept of 
stewardship in this context is argued to offer insights as to how the economic model of governance with 
its reliance on agency theory might be extended to provide a model of governance that facilitates the 
achievement of economic and non-economic stewardship responsibilities.  Public values offer a means to 
define the complete, economic and non-economic suite of stewardship responsibilities. 
 This paper presented the emerging stewardship responsibilities of governments and private providers 
of infrastructure.  The paper also considered whether new collaborative arrangements are capable of 
providing a better (stewardship) outcome than other models such as a single departmental agency 
carrying out all associated stewardship roles or the contracting out of the entire operation and 
maintenance of the asset.  It is argued there is potential for models to be developed that mix the emerging 
organizational and contractual forms of governance. 
The contribution of these models will be important as the research into infrastructure governance is not 
advanced with there being a clear need for greater understanding of the relationships which are in play in 
such a wide range of infrastructure governance arrangements.  Stewardship theory emerges as a powerful 
tool to apply to the examination of case studies of typical and atypical infrastructure governance 
arrangements. 
The further development of stewardship theory, the definition of the stewardship in terms of public 
values and the proposed research of the current infrastructure governance arrangements will provide data 
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and information to be used by those interested in the outcomes of infrastructure assets.  Stewardship 
theory is concluded to offer insights into arrangements for the ‘good’ governance of infrastructure assets. 
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